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the turkIsh armed forces In PolItIcs 
the end of guardIanshIP?
On 6 January 2012, General Ilker Basbug, one of 
Turkey’s former Chiefs of Staff (2008–2010), was 
arrested on charges of founding and leading a ter-
rorist group with the aim of toppling the government 
(HDN 2012). Basbug is the only former Chief of 
Staff in Turkey to be arrested in connection with on-
going investigations into alleged conspiracies against 
the government, but he is not alone. So far, more 
than 200 retired and active duty officers have been 
arrested on conspiracy charges, more than forty of 
them with the rank of general. 
Six months earlier, on 31 July 2011, General Isik 
Kosaner, at the time Chief of Staff and Basbug’s suc-
cessor in the job, had resigned. The commanders of 
the country’s Land, Air and Naval forces did like-
wise. General Necdet Özel, commander of the para-
military Gendermerie, was subsequently appointed 
new Chief of Staff.
The immediate reason for the joint resignation of 
Kosaner and the other generals was a disagree-
ment between the Turkish General Staff (TGS) and 
the government over the promotion of a number of 
senior officers under investigation for allegedly plan-
ning to topple the government. However, behind the 
decision to resign was a growing sense of frustra-
tion in the military leadership over the continued at-
tempts of the government to curb the autonomy of 
the Armed Forces.
The resignation of a serving Chief of Staff and three 
of his force commanders in the face of political pres-
sure, and the arrest of a former Chief of Staff on 
charges of terrorism, are unprecedented and would 
have been almost unthinkable in Turkey a decade 
ago. They can be taken as indications of the weaken-
ing political power of the Turkish Armed Forces, and 
the ongoing shift in the country towards civilianisa-
tion of civil–military ties. 
Over the last ten years, relations between the re-
ligious-conservative AKP government (Adalet ve 
Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) – 
AKP) and the military leadership have varied from 
tense to confrontational. Government policies on 
religion and the Kurdish question have been viewed 
with great suspicion by the military leadership which 
fears for the secularist identity and national integrity 
of the Turkish state – the very principles they see 
themselves as responsible for guarding. The govern-
ment for its part has managed to curb the autonomy 
of the military and its political influence by a variety 
of means, ranging from formal restrictions on mili-
tary representation in civilian bodies, to allowing a 
number of conspiracy investigations against former 
and serving military officers. 
In this article an attempt is made to outline the main 
changes in civil–military relations in Turkey during 
the last decade, present some of the explanations 
for these changes and, finally, discuss whether the 
Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) will permanently with-
draw from politics, or if it can retain its guardianship 
role in some form or another.
Turkey’s importance in the international community 
is growing. As a strategic fulcrum between Europe, 
Asia and the Middle East, Turkey is important for 
the maintenance of security and stability in neigh-
bouring regions, and for securing Western interests 
in the Middle East and Asia. Turkey has a large and 
growing population of 72 million, and would be 
the second largest country in the European Union 
if admitted as a member state. Turkey has also po-
sitioned itself as a main corridor for energy supplies 
to Europe, tying the question of political stability in 
the country to future developments in global energy 
markets. Politically, Turkey is a rare example of de-
mocracy in a country with a Muslim majority, and po-
litical developments in the country are followed with 
interest by other states in the Muslim world. Under 
the current AKP government, Ankara has pursued a 
more active and independent foreign policy towards 
countries such as China and Russia, and sought a 
role as facilitator and mediator in international con-
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flicts and conflict areas such as Afghanistan, Iran, 
Syria and the Israel–Palestinian conflict. The Turk-
ish Armed Forces are the second largest in NATO in 
terms of personnel, and Turkish forces participate in 
NATO and UN-led operations far beyond the coun-
try’s borders – for example in Afghanistan and the 
Bay of Aden.
changes In cIvIl–mIlItary relatIons In turkey sInce 2000
The military has been an important political actor in 
Turkey since the founding of the republic in 1923. 
Entrusted by law1 with the dual task of protecting 
the state and guarding its founding principles, the 
military has played a decisive role in shaping the 
political course of the country – both from behind 
the scenes and by direct intervention in government. 
Since the first military coup in 1960, the role of 
TAF in politics has by and large been one of guard-
ians. Nordlinger defines this guardian role as one 
in which the military seeks governmental control 
with the objective to preserve status quo and correct 
what they perceive as malpractices and deficiencies 
(1977, 22). According to Nilüfer Narli, “the military 
built what A. Robin Luckham defines as a ‘covert 
guardianship model’ that permitted it to use various 
forms of intervention, ranging from a coup to con-
trolling and influencing the civilian political process 
through formal and informal mechanisms” (2011, 
215). One could say that civilian governments dur-
ing much of the republican period shared power with 
the military. Through its role as guardian of the Con-
stitution, the military has had a powerful position in 
the affairs of state, and been able to decide the fate 
of governments and politicians. On four occasions 
(1960, 1971, 1980, 1997), the military has inter-
vened directly to change the government. All were 
successful in the sense that the military was able 
to change the course of events in their own favour. 
Directly placed under the Prime Minister’s Office 
rather than the Ministry of Defence, the military has 
enjoyed sufficient autonomy to influence decisions 
by the political leadership on budgetary allocations 
to the Armed Forces (Bayramoglu and Insel 2009). 
The requirements of the military have also driven the 
rapid development of Turkey’s military industry. The 
Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund (OYAK) long 
enjoyed special privileges in the markets, and is still 
one of the largest investment companies in Turkey 
with business interests in the manufacturing, com-
mercial, services and financial sectors (Akca 2010). 
The officer corps has been a privileged group in 
Turkish society, respected and trusted by the popu-
lation and enjoying special privileges in the form of 
high quality education, secure employment, housing, 
and various other welfare benefits. Generally, the ties 
between the military and the population have been 
good and strong. Known for its adherence to law and 
order and incorrupt ways, the military has been the 
most trusted institution in the country, scoring much 
better in opinion polls than any civil-political organi-
sation. Military interventions in politics were also, by 
and large, accepted by the population as a necessity 
in times of political unrest. 
However, since the turn of the millennium, and 
in particular after 2002 when the religious- 
conservative AKP came to power, the character of 
civil–military relations in Turkey changed. Political, 
institutional and constitutional reforms have curbed 
the powers of the military to influence government 
decision-making process. The National Security 
Council, traditionally controlled by the military, is 
now dominated by civilians, and has also lost some 
of its ability to influence government decision- 
making. The military is no longer represented in 
institutions that oversee higher education and the 
media (Lagendijk 2010, 12), and military judges 
no longer serve on the benches of the State Security 
Courts (Jenkins 2007, 347). Defence budgeting and 
procurement, largely exempt from accountability to 
elected representatives in the past, are now at least 
partly under parliamentary oversight and can be sub-
jected to auditing (Narli 2009, 67–71). With a few 
notable exceptions, the General Staff has also been 
more restrained in issuing statements on political is-
sues during the last decade compared to previous 
decades. The civilian government has also demon-
strated great will and capability to influence matters 
of military importance, such as the appointment of 
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top military l eaders – matters that used to consid-
ered internal matters for the military to decide and 
the government to approve. With a new constitu-
tion in the making, the Armed Forces will likely be 
organisationally placed under a strengthened Minis-
try of Defence, rather than the PM’s office, with the 
government attempting to change the constitutional 
articles and laws legitimising the guardianship role 
of the military
In sum, one can say that, until the turn of the millen-
nium, civil–military relations in Turkey were charac-
terised by relatively weak civil-political institutions, 
on the one hand, and a strong military institution on 
the other. However, during the last decade, power 
relations have changed in favour of the civilian in-
stitutions. 
factors PromotIng the cIvIlIanIsatIon of cIvIl–mIlItary tIes
Two external and four internal factors are often cited 
as explanations of the diminishing political role of 
the TAF over the last decade. (1) The EU harmoni-
sation process has required reforms to secure civilian 
supremacy over the Armed Forces and greater trans-
parency in its affairs; (2) changes in national threat 
perceptions since the 1990s have meant that many 
issues that were formerly seen as matters of security 
to be handled by the TGS, are now defined as mat-
ters of policy to be handled by the civilian govern-
ment; (3) since 2001 Turkey has enjoyed a decade 
of almost unprecedented political stability, with ma-
jority governments with both the intent and capa-
bility to curb the political power of the military; (4) 
a new elite with more conservative religious values 
has become prominent within political institutions, 
the state bureaucracy, education and business, mar-
ginalising the traditional Kemalist elite, an important 
segment of which comprises high-ranking officers; 
(5) there has been an apparent change of percep-
tion within the officer corps regarding the military’s 
guardianship role , making some senior officers more 
receptive to the idea of civilian supremacy; and (6) 
public opinion, while still supportive of a strong mili-
tary, has grown less positive to the idea of military 
intervention in politics.  
The first and most important external factor is Tur-
key’s bid for membership of the European Union. 
After four decades of starting and stopping, the door 
to Turkish membership negotiations was finally 
opened in 1999. However, the process of EU ac-
cession required Turkey to enact certain political re-
forms. Among these reforms was the establishment 
of civilian supremacy and oversight over the coun-
try’s Armed Forces. To comply with EU demands, 
Turkey reduced or terminated military representation 
in civilian government bodies, introduced greater 
transparency in defence spending and defence policy 
making, and improved parliamentary oversight of the 
military (Sarigil 2011, 272; Narli 2009, 57). These 
reforms were the result of a grand compromise be-
tween the major political forces in Turkey which saw 
them as necessary concessions for future member-
ship in the Union. The reforms were also accepted 
by the General Staff – even if they meant the military 
lost autonomy and political influence. The TAF have 
always supported modernisation of Turkey and de-
mocratisation of the country’s political system, and 
perceived EU membership as an important step for-
ward for Turkey to become a democratic European 
country with a strong economy and a modern army. 
The military also believed that the process leading to 
EU membership offered the best options to confront 
domestic challenges such as Islamism and Kurdish 
separatism (Aydinli et al. 1986, 84-85).
Second, changes in Turkey’s national threat percep-
tions during the 1990s resulted in a reduced role 
for the Armed Forces in politics. Traditional security 
issues were gradually re-defined as political mat-
ters to be dealt with by the government rather than 
the general staff. Communism, Kurdish separatism 
and Islamism had long been perceived as principal 
challenges to the integrity of the Turkish state. In 
addition, there was the long-lasting dispute with 
Greece – mainly over the question of Cyprus – and 
a tense relationship with many of Turkey’s neigh-
bours to the East: Iran, Iraq and Syria. However, the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the 
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Cold War in 1991; the shutting down of the Islamist 
Welfare Party after the so-called “soft” military coup 
in 1997; the capture and sentencing of PKK leader 
Abdullah Öcalan in 1999; and the rapprochement 
between Greece and Turkey from the late 1990s, 
all led to a reassessment in Turkey of national se-
curity challenges and how best to respond to them. 
In particular, after the 1999 capture of Öcalan and 
a reduction in violence after years of armed struggle 
against Kurdish militants, a new and more political 
approach to the whole Kurdish question gained trac-
tion. This new approach was also supported by the 
military, which, by the turn of the millennium, had 
grown weary of its inability to eradicate the threat 
posed by political extremism, and therefore more 
willing to consider a political response to security 
questions (Aydinli et al. 2006, 86). The relationship 
with Syria improved markedly after the expulsion 
of Öcalan from his refuge in Damascus, and closer 
trade relations with Iraq and Iran were established. 
During the last decade, Turkey has also actively 
sought to engage its neighbouring countries in po-
litical dialogue and economic cooperation – using 
so-called “soft power” to achieve foreign and secu-
rity policy goals. These developments have contrib-
uted to a more general shift in responsibility for and 
expertise on security policy issues from the TGS to 
government ministeries, reducing further the role of 
the TGS in security policy formation. 
Third, Turkey has been enjoying a long period of 
political stability since the early 2000s, under three 
majority governments formed by the AKP. During 
the same period the country experienced strong and 
sustained economic growth, adding to the popularity 
of and support for the AKP – also from constituen-
cies that do not identify with the religious aspects 
of the party. This has greatly empowered the civilian 
government, enabling it to change existing institu-
tions and practices. Civilianisation of civil–military 
relations has been an important goal of the AKP, and 
because of its parliamentary majority and large voter 
constituency, it has been possible for the government 
to push for reform of this sector. The strong perfor-
mance of the AKP has also made it difficult for the 
military to influence government policy, or to counter 
measures by the government to curb the autonomy 
of the Armed Forces. Under the favourable political 
and economic circumstances enjoyed by Turkey in 
recent years, the General Staff would have been hard 
pressed to find the necessary legitimacy or public 
support for yet another intervention in politics. 
The change in civil–military relations in Turkey can 
also be linked to the circulation of elites in the country 
over the last three decades, starting in earnest with 
the liberalising reforms introduced under the Özal 
governments in the 1980s and 1990s. The emer-
gence of new elites deprived the military of many of 
its former allies in the state apparatus, the business 
community, institutions of higher education and the 
media, and made it more difficult to influence and 
intervene in the political decision-making process. 
Elites in Turkey can be broadly divided into two 
ideological categories: a secularist or Kemalist elite2 
dominating state, politics and business for most of 
the period after 1923; and an Islamist counter-
elite that rose to prominence during the 1980s and 
1990s (Göle 1997). Due to their role as guardians 
of the republic, senior military officers have consti-
tuted a central group within the Kemalist elite, and 
a bastion for the defence of Kemalist values. While 
not strictly Islamist, the background of many leaders 
in the AKP is similar to that of the Islamist counter-
elite described by Göle. Beginning in the 1990s, and 
in particular after the coming to power of the AKP 
in 2002, this new elite, espousing more conserva-
tive and religious values than the traditional secular 
establishment, rose to positions of power in state in-
stitutions, the business community, media and the 
universities – including former Kemalist strongholds 
such as the judiciary and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
One could therefore say that the military elite, being 
staunch defenders of Kemalism, has become more 
isolated as other elite groups within the state, poli-
tics and business have become more diverse.
Fifth, militaries are often analysed as unitary sys-
tems possessed of a strong esprit de corps, whose 
active members express and support one official line 
on questions concerning the role of the military in 
politics and society. However, as the history of civ-
il–military relations in the Turkish Republic shows, 
there were always differences of opinions in the of-
ficer corps concerning the necessity of intervening in 
politics and the goals of such interventions.3 Accord-
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ing to Metin Heper and Ersel Aydinli, among oth-
ers, there seem today to be different factions within 
the officer corps on the interpretation and exercise 
of Kemalism and the guardianship role of the TAF. 
From the early 1980s onwards, Heper writes, at 
least some members of the senior military leadership 
began to question the wisdom of military interven-
tions in politics. General Hilmi Özkök, Chief of Gen-
eral Staff 2002–2006, took this debate further by 
suggesting that Kemalism was a world-view open to 
change, not a closed system of thought – an ideol-
ogy (Heper 2011, 242). According to Aydinli, there 
appear to be two distinct factions within the officer 
corps when it comes to the role of the military in pol-
itics. Traditionalists (or absolutists) who insist that 
the military must retain an active role in the politi-
cal process to secure outcomes that are in line with 
strict Kemalist thinking; and reformists (or gradual-
ists) who support further civilianisation and accept a 
more withdrawn role for the military (Aydinli 2011, 
228–232). While it is difficult to identify the lean-
ings of recent Chiefs of Staff in relation to these 
camp, general Hilmi Özkök (2002–2006) and the 
current Chief of Staff, general Necdet Özel (2011–), 
both seem to belong to the gradualists. The pic-
ture is less clear when it comes to Yasar Büyükanit 
(2006–2008), Ilker Basbug (2008–2010) and Isik 
Kosaner (2010–2011), who, at least in some of 
their political statements, seem to have harboured 
more traditionalist views than Özkök and Özel. 
Finally, the public’s opinion of the Armed Forces 
has changed. The TAF is still the most popular and 
trusted institution in the country, notwithstanding 
the large number of senior officers accused of con-
spiracy and coup plans, but popular support for mili-
tary intervention in politics seems to be on the wane 
(Sarigil 2011, 270–276). This change can be said 
to reflect the consolidation of Turkish democracy, 
signalling the start of an era when military interven-
tions may no longer be feasible or desired (Aydinli 
2011, 236). Public opinion matters greatly to the 
General Staff. The strong bond between the Army 
and the population is a historical legacy of almost 
mythical proportions in Turkey (Narli 2009, 61), 
and the Armed Forces owe much of their privileged 
status to the support they enjoy in the population. 
Among military officers there is a sense of superior-
ity and a strong disdain and distrust of politicians 
and politics, but not of the citizens of the country 
(Sarigil 2011, 275). On the contrary, whenever the 
military leadership decided to intervene, it was often 
done in the name of the nation and the people, and 
despite the brutality sometimes meted out by mili-
tary regimes on left-wing political activists, Kurdish 
and Islamist groups, these interventions have by and 
large been perceived as legitimate and necessary by 
the public at large. One could say that there has al-
most been an expectation in Turkish society that the 
military would intervene if the civilian government 
proved unable to act decisively in the face of exter-
nal and internal threats. Given the special relation-
ship between the military and society in Turkey, the 
shift in public opinion against military interventions 
in politics has most likely mattered to the TGS and 
been important in its considerations of how to re-
spond to the policies of the government.
end of guardIanshIP? 
Given the changes in civil–military relations in 
T urkey over the last decade, the question must be 
asked what the future role of the Turkish Armed 
Forces in politics will be. Is the traditional guardian-
ship role of the TAF in Turkish politics over? 
Zeki Sarigil has described three different outcomes 
for civil–military relations in Turkey in the future: (1) 
the military will continue to intervene in politics and 
retain its public popularity; (2) the military will con-
tinue to intervene in politics at the cost of popular-
ity and legitimacy in society; and (3) the military will 
withdraw from politics while keeping a prestigious 
and trustworthy position (Sarigil 2011, 275).
As Sarigil points out, scenario number two seems 
the least likely of the three. The strong bond between 
the military and the public in Turkey, and the impor-
tance of this bond for the legitimacy and prestige of 
the Armed Forces, makes it highly improbable that 
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the military leadership will continue to intervene in 
the political process if such interventions are highly 
unpopular and perceived as illegitimate. 
Scenario three is probably the most likely. It can be 
argued that as Turkey is adjusting to European Un-
ion norms, and indeed to a changing international 
environment, the political role of the Armed Forces 
must also change. There is simply no room or need 
for a military overseeing or guiding governments on 
security policy and defence issues. Enduring politi-
cal stability, the emergence of new elite groups with 
a different world-view from that of the traditional 
Kemalist establishment, and a growing public opin-
ion against military interventions, have also eroded 
much of the legitimacy of and opportunity for further 
military interventions. Even if the military leadership 
perceived a need to intervene against the civilian 
government today, it is difficult to see how it could 
be done with any legitimacy or support from civil-
ian groups or the general public. Parts of the officer 
corps also seem to question the very idea of military 
intervention, preferring to keep a low political profile 
and cooperating with the government. This attitude 
is probably enhanced by the ongoing legal processes 
against retired and serving officers accused of con-
spiracy. It seems reasonable, then, to conclude that 
if current trends in Turkish politics, economy and 
society are to continue, the military will, over time, 
give up its traditional guardianship role, accept ci-
vilian supremacy, thus retaining a prestigious and 
trustworthy position in society.
However, there may be reason for caution about the 
future role of the Armed Forces in Turkish politics. 
The current situation with a strong civilian govern-
ment and a politically quiescent military is not un-
precedented in Turkish history. During the 1950s, 
Turkey was ruled by the Democrat Party under the 
leadership of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. The 
Menderes government strengthened civilian con-
trol of the Armed Forces, and changed the chain of 
command, obliging the Chief of Staff to report to the 
Minister of Defence instead of directly to the Prime 
Minister. Amidst growing authoritarianism and po-
litical turmoil in the latter half of the decade, ele-
ments within the officer corps decided to intervene 
and staged Turkey’s first military coup in 1960. 
Following the coup, institutional mechanisms to 
safeguard the political influence of the Armed Forc-
es were reinstated and strengthened (Hale 1994, 
88–113). While today’s situation is, of course, very 
different from that of the 1950s, the events leading 
up to the 1960 coup are a reminder of the change-
ability of civil–military relations in Turkey – both in 
the direction of civilianisation and reversals back to 
militarisation. The last decade in Turkey has been 
characterised by increasingly close interaction with 
Europe and other neighbouring regions, political sta-
bility and strong economic growth. These develop-
ments have been accompanied by a reduction in the 
political role of the military, and a growing opinion in 
society against military interventions. The question 
is whether this picture would change in the face of 
a national crisis – set off by growing external and/or 
internal security threats, increasing political instabil-
ity, a severe economic downturn or (most likely) a 
combination of all three. As mentioned several times 
already, while the public is against military interven-
tions in politics at the moment, the polls also indi-
cate the military is still the most trusted institution in 
Turkish society. Also, as referred to above, a faction 
of the senior officers still stands firm on the princi-
ple of the military’s political guardianship role. This 
role is very much part of the officers’ ethos, which 
in turn is rooted in the perceived historical cause of 
the Armed Forces (Jenkins 2001, 33–35), and goes 
beyond the various constitutional articles and legal 
codes often said to make up the legal basis of mili-
tary interventions (Sarigil 2011, 274). It is there-
fore not inconceivable that the Armed Forces will 
decide to intervene in politics again given a situa-
tion in which such intervention will be welcomed by 
Turkish society as a way to stabilise a crisis situation 
which the civilian authorities seem unable to handle 
on their own. Such a situation would also give im-
petus to the traditionalists among the senior officers 
and motivate them to take action. It would resemble 
Sarigil’s scenario 1, where political intervention by 
the military can be carried out without loss of popu-
larity or legitimacy. 
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endnotes
1 The three main laws relating to the status and legal responsibilities of the Turkish Armed Forces are: The Turkish 
Constitution (1982), The Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law (1961), and The National Security Council 
Law (1983) (Jenkins 2001, 42).
2 Broadly speaking, the Kemalist elite has been made up by a cultural and economic alliance between the state elite 
in Ankara and the Istanbul-based capitalists who for many years were dominant in Turkey’s regulated economy. 
This alliance was based on an agreement over secularism and the Kemalist ideology. Economic liberalisation under 
the governments headed by Prime Minister Turgut Özal (1983-1989) paved the way for a religious-conservative 
Anatolian bourgeoisie that eventually became an ideological and political challenge to the secularists (Yavuz 2009, 
52). 
3 For a comprehensive account of civil-military relations in Turkey from the last years of the Ottoman Empire until 
the early 1990s, see William Hale. 1994. Turkish Politcs and the Military, London: Routledge.
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